To analyze these behaviors, we propose here a simple model of how anticipatory or self-esteem concerns lead to the inefficient breakdown of Coasian bargaining under symmetric information, as both sides seek to self-enhance by turning down "insultingly low" offers. To do so, we build on Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2007) , which develops a general framework for analyzing social and economic phenomena involving beliefs which people "invest in".
The underlying idea is that individuals are often uncertain or insecure about their own "deep values", abilities or worth; and that, having better, more objective access to the track record of their actions than to the exact mix of motivations that spurred them, they are rationally led to judge themselves by what they do. 1 When contemplating choices, they then factor in what kind of a person each alternative would "make them" and the desirability of those self-views. The theory is thus cognitive, as it explicitly models identity and related concepts as beliefs and emphasizes the self-inference process through which they operate. At the same time, the value of identity or dignity arises because they confer affective benefits, functional ones, or both. The first case arises when self-esteem has pure consumption value or when future prospects give rise to anticipatory feelings such as savoring or dread. The second obtains when a strong sense of self provides clear priorities and directions that help the individual mobilize energy and resist short-term temptations.
Building on these two core assumptions -selfinference and motivated beliefs-we extend here the framework to bargaining and other distributive conflicts. We consider a partnership of two individuals or 1 See, e.g., Leon Festinger and James M. Carlsmith (1959) on cognitive dissonance, Darryl J. Bem (1972) on self-perception and George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky (1984) on the self-manipulation of "diagnostic" actions. For recent experiments on the strategic management of selfimage through costly actions or information-avoidance, see Jason Dana, Jason X. Kuang and Roberto A. Weber(2007) and Nina Mazar, On Amir and Dan Ariely (2006) . groups (parties in a dispute, capital and labor, majority and minority populations) who must decide whether to continue together or destroy the match. Continuation always yields a positive surplus, but a low output realization means that at least one party has low ability. Moreover, whereas joint output is hard data, individual contributions to it ("who is to blame", "who is getting a raw deal") are soft signals, symmetrically observed when producing and bargaining but imperfectly recalled following a split. Agreeing to inferior or even equal contractual terms in a low-performance team then entails a loss in self image and / or anticipatory utility. Conversely, by refusing "insulting" proposals and destroying the match when they do not obtain enough of a concession, each side can try to preserve or salvage their dignity and shift the blame onto the other, taking refuge from bleak realities in feelings of self-righteousness and wishful hopes for "a better tomorrow". In equilibrium, the range of sustainable sharing rules is shown to shrink with the importance of self-image or anticipatory concerns. Beyond a point, a bargaining impasse becomes unavoidable, in spite of gains from trade and fully symmetric information.
The paper relates first to the literature on cognitive dissonance and motivated beliefs (e.g., George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens (1982), Matthew Rabin (1994) , Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2006a) , Markus Brunnermeier and Jonathan Parker (2005) ), as well as the related issue of anticipatory feelings (e.g., Loewenstein (1987) , Andrew Caplin and John V. Leahy (2001) ). Most closely related, through the idea of self-signaling or self-reputation, are Ronit Bodner and Drazen Prelec (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004, 2006b ). On the experimental side, James Konow (2000) and Dana, Kuang, and Weber (2003) demonstrate that subjects making monetary allocations affecting their own payoffs engage in selfdeception and information avoidance about the fairness or likelihood of other players' outcomes.
The second related body of work is that on identity (e.g., Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2005) , Robert J. Oxoby (2003)). In these models, agent's preferences or attitudes depend on their chosen group memberships. We instead explicitly model the management of beliefs and the cognitive mechanisms through which it occurs. This also leads to different results, such as the fact that being able to manage his own identity can often make a person worse off.
Finally, there is a recent literature on bargaining and contracting with heterogenous beliefs (e.g., Muhamet Yildiz (2004) , Nageeb Ali (2006) ). Its general motivation is also to understand the sources of delays and breakdowns, but its methods and focus are quite different. In particular, beliefs are exogenous and remain invariant to offers and counteroffers. On the other hand, these papers make explicit the dynamic aspect of bargaining, whereas we consider a much simpler Nash demand game.
I. Model

A. Technology
We consider a "partnership" between two riskneutral individuals or groups -spouses, labor and management, majority and minority populations, etc. Each individual may be of high or low type, H (probability ρ) or L (probability 1−ρ), corresponding to different levels of ability, motivation, honesty, deservedness, outside opportunities, etc. There are three periods, as illustrated in Figure 1 , and we abstract from discounting. At date 0, the joint output or productivity of the partnership is revealed: it is either good or bad, y ∈ {y B , y G }, with y G > y B . The technology exhibits complementarity, in that y = y G if and only if both agents are of type H. The interesting case will then be when y = y L , since this means that at least one of the parties is "to blame" for the low output -disappointing marriage, firm or economy, lost war, etc.
At the end of period 0, the two partners must decide whether to: (i) remain together, in which case they will continue to produce the same (expected) output in period 2 (the long run), and must bargain over how it will be shared; or (ii) split, in which case each agent i will get a reservation value determined by his type:
These outside options may correspond to producing in autarky, searching for a new match, or triggering a costly fight with the other side for control of resources.
Let parameters be such that staying together is efficient for all teams, both balanced (H H or L L) and unbalanced (H L), but in the latter case a compensating transfer (or share of y B exceeding 1/2) is needed to induce the more productive partner to stay:
When bargaining and making their stay or quit decisions at the end of period 0, the two parties are assumed to know (from recent observation) not only the 
B. Preferences and beliefs
In keeping with our general self-inference approach to identity, we further assume that, at date 1 : (i) Whereas the level of joint output y is "hard" data that is easy to remember and verify, individuals's separate contributions to it -their types v-represent soft, unverifiable information, which later on is only imperfectly recalled. 2 Indeed, it would always be more pleasant, ceteris paribus, to "recall" that one was the competent and honest partner and the other was entirely to blame for the team's poor performance ("everyone thinks they are a superperformer").
(ii) Individuals experience anticipatory feelings, such as hope and dread, from their long-run (date-2) income or consumption prospects. Alternatively, they may derive utility from pure self-esteem about their talent or worth.
We now formalize and discuss further each of these two premises.
For a person's past choices to define his sense of identity or dignity they must be informative about the "kind of person" he is, and therefore he must, at times, not be fully confident of his own type -deep values, abilities, etc. Similarly, if he later perfectly understood that what tipped the scales on a decision was the desire to achieve a certain self-image, such attempts would come to nil. Some form of imperfect self-knowledge (memory, accessibility) is therefore essential to understanding how people's choices can be shaped by concerns such as "being true to myself," "maintaining my integrity," "keeping my selfrespect", etc. And indeed, there is extensive evidence that people's recall of their past feelings, efforts and motivations is highly imperfect and self-serving, that they judge themselves by their behavior, and consequently tailor the latter to preserve certain self-views. 3 ASSUMPTION 1: (Self-inference). At date 1, each player is aware (or reminded) of past individual contributions, v i , i = 1, 2, only with probability λ. With probability 1 − λ, he no longer recalls (has access to) these signals and uses instead the outcome of the negotiation to infer his and the other player's types.
We denote byρ i individual i's date-1 belief about "what kind of a person" he is and byv i ≡ρ i v H + (1 −ρ i )v L the corresponding expected ability, either of which defines his (subjective) sense of identity. With probability λ, the posteriorv i is thus equal to the true value (or unbiased signal) v i , and with probability 1 − λ it is equal to the conditional expectationv i ∈ [v L , v H ] that can be inferred from what offers were made and whether they were accepted or rejected. We assume that, in making these inferences at t = 1, players are fully rational Bayesians. Although this assumption can easily be relaxed, it is a natural benchmark and imposes discipline on the extent to which agents can chose to believe what suits them. 4 What suits them, in turn, depends on the affective needs and instrumental functions that identity or dignity serves for them. As discussed in Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2007) , the former include pure egogratification as well as remaining hopeful about one's future prospects (anticipatory utility); the latter include the motivational value of "believing in oneself" to achieve long-term goals and overcome self-control problems, as well as a possible facilitating role in signaling to others (if it is easier to persuade others of a claim, true or false, when one is convinced of it). We shall focus here on the first class of motives, namely "mental consumptions" (Thomas Schelling (1985) ), but also explain in Section B how a simple variant yields a functional role for dignity, which strengthens the will to resist momentary temptations.
In what follows, we denote by E i t an agent i's expectations at date t = 0, 1. 
where u i 1 is a utility flow received during period 1 and equal to either:
As made clear by our notation, the two cases are closely related. Throughout the paper we shall focus the exposition on (i), which is somewhat more "consequentialist", but all the results are qualitatively identical with (ii). 4 It also makes the model directly applicable to contexts where the two bargaining parties are signaling to an outside audience. Such social-reputational concerns, however, are "shut off" (through anonymity) in all the cited experimental evidence In many field surveys, they also seem secondary in importance to individuals' self-perceptions (see, e.g., the above quotations from Bewley (1999)). Thus, although self-reputation and social reputation are very complementary concerns, they correspond to empirically distinct phenomena and their analyses point to different mediating mechanisms -in particular, the key role of memory or retrospective accessibility in the pursuit of self-serving beliefs.
C. Bargaining
We formalize the bargaining process as a standard Nash demand game. At t = 0, with full and symmetric information, players 1 and 2 simultaneously make demands for shares θ 1 and θ 2 of future output, y. 5 A larger share may correspond to a monetary transfer, a control right (regional autonomy, child custody, seats on the board) or a new performance measurement system that will alter the sensitivity of income shares to individual contributions. If θ 1 +θ 2 ≤ 1 each gets what they asked for, whereas if θ 1 + θ 2 > 1 the negotiation breaks down and the pair dissolves. We assume that offers are later remembered (having been formally recorded, submitted to an arbitrator, etc.), but the key results are similar when they are not.
We first look for a symmetric, pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, with agreement on shares θ * H > 1/2 > θ * L for the high and low types respectively in an unbalanced partnership, and on a common share 1/2 in a balanced one. When no such equilibrium can be sustained we look for one (still in pure strategies) with partial efficiency, where of the two types of partnerships reaches agreement.
We restrict out-of equilibrium beliefs as follows. A pair with output y G is unambiguously identified as H H, due to technological constraints. For pairs with output y B, let denote the set of offers made in equilibrium.
(1) For θ i ∈ and θ j / ∈ , player i is presumed to have played on the equilibrium path. If this identifies him as an H type, then his partner must be an L. Otherwise, we use the D1 criterion to restrict beliefs on his partner's type.
(2) If θ i and θ j are both in but are jointly inconsistent with equilibrium, then: (i) if θ i = θ j (e.g., both sides demand θ * H > 1/2) the two players are considered equally likely to have deviated, and thus assigned the same image; (ii) if
this is in the spirit of standard equilibrium refinements (such as D1), since it is always the strong type who has less to lose from breaking up the match. 5 We treat the allocation of period-0 output (if any) as sunk -e.g., shared ex ante on a 50-50 basis, before types are revealed. Since expected output is equal in both periods, allowing initial resources to be part of the bargaining would simply amount to doubling the size of the pie.
II. Results and Implications
A. Equilibrium
Let us first observe that in any equilibrium with agreement, the shares demanded by both sides must sum to 1. Otherwise, either party can ask for ε percent more and gain (1 + s)εy, since the team will still stay together. For the same reason, downward deviations by either type (asking for less than the equilibrium share) are never profitable. The binding constraints will thus correspond to upward deviations.
Since (1 + s)y G /2 > (1 + s)v H , matched strong partners (H H) always stay together, sharing output equally. The interesting case is that of lowproductivity pairs, y = y B . Consider first bargaining in an unbalanced (H L) team. For the H type to be satisfied with his share, it must be that:
Otherwise he could ask for more, which would break up the team while maintaining his posterior beliefv = v H (since the other party is only asking for θ * L < 1/2, which identifies him as an L type in a mixed pair) and
Next, for the weak partner (L type) to accept the bargain, it must be that:
Otherwise, he could deviate and break the match by demanding θ * H (mimicking the strong partner), thus achieving with probability 1 − λ the posterior self-viewv =v, even though his true "worth" and outside option is only v L . Other deviations to θ > θ L with θ = θ * H would still identify him as the weak type,v = v L , and be a fortiori unprofitable under (4).
The set of mutually agreeable sharing rules
As illustrated in Figure 2 , it shrinks as identity concerns increase, up to
when the denominator is positive (otherwise, let s * ≡ +∞). Beyond this critical threshold a bargaining impasse arises, in spite of gains from trade and symmetric information. Intuitively, a higher s makes the loss of self-image involved in "admitting blame" more costly for the L type, who then requires a higher θ * L to be compensated. At some point this becomes more than the H type is willing to grant given his outside option, and no agreement can be reached. The two parties then split (or fight) by both demanding θ * H . We next turn to bargaining in an L L team. By asking for a share θ > 1/2, either side can break up the match and achieve, with probability 1−λ, a self image v H . Therefore, the partnership remains sustainable
when the denominator is positive (if not, let s * ≡ +∞). Otherwise the match is dissolved, as each side seeks to convince himself that he is better than the other (demanding again θ * H ), even though in reality both are equally bad.
In general, s * * can be above s * , as illustrated in Figure 2 , or below it. For brevity, we shall focus on the case s * < s * * , which occurs (for all λ) if and only if 3y B /2 < 2v H + v L . 6 Together with (1), this means
We obtain a further result by linking joint output to individual productivities. Consistent with our earlier assumptions, let H L and L L pairs both produce Our model of bargaining with malleable beliefs identifies a new and potentially important limit to the achievement of Coasian deals, namely the preservation of dignity, pride, or "hope" about the future. It also leads to testable predictions, as both salience s and the productivity differential v H /v L can be manipulated experimentally. The latter can also be measured empirically in real-world contexts, where one should observe that more unequal bargaining positions reduce the likelihood of agreement.
From (6) and (7), we also have: 
B. Welfare
When H L pairs split both sides must be asking for the same θ * H > 1/2, and when L L pairs also split the same must hold. Otherwise (by our first equilibrium refinement) one agent can deviate to θ * H and achieve self-reputation v H . In any pair that splits, therefore, each side ends up with
is the average value of v over all such dissolutions, equal tov when only H L pairs dissolve and to (ρv H + 7 In other words, the production technology is of the
There is thus, in fine, no net gain in self-esteem or anticipatory utility, only a transfer from the high to the low type within H L pairs, and from H L to L L pairs when the latter also break up. The pursuit of self-enhancement is a zero-sum game that leads only to a net destruction of surplus, equal (on average over all dissolving pairs) to (1 + s) (y B − 2ṽ) > 0. In Bénabou and Tirole (2007) we show that, whereas the positive implications of individual belief management are very similar whether it arises from hedonic motives (self-esteem, anticipatory feelings) or instrumental ones (sense of direction, selfdiscipline), normative conclusions, by contrast, depend critically on this distinction. A similar principle applies in the present strategic context. Due to space constraints, we only sketch here this variant of the bargaining model that leads to a more attractive role (normatively speaking) for dignity concerns.
The only additional assumption is that, at date 1, each individual may need to carry out a task that:
(i) requires costly effort or perseverance, but is potentially subject to a self-control problem (e.g., due to hyperbolic discounting, β < 1);
(ii) has an expected return that increases with the agent's individual productivity v, so that perseverance and self-viewv are complements.
The date-1 task may be independent of whether the agent is paired or unpaired at that time, or it could apply only to unpaired agents: searching for better opportunities, fighting, or holding out longer in costly bargaining.
In such settings, pooling by rejecting "realistic" offers boosts the v L type's self-confidence and subsequent motivation, but weakens that of the v H type. The first effect leads to a welfare gain, the second to a loss. Therefore when the nature of the date-1 selfcontrol problem (value or probability distribution of β, returns to effort) makes it more of a concern for the low type than for the high one, meaning that its severity is moderate, there is a net efficiency gain from the malleability of beliefs (λ < 1) and the enhancement of the low types' dignity that it allows. When the selfcontrol problem is harder, however, meaning that its affects the high types more often than the low ones, there is again a net social loss.
III. Conclusion
A simple model was proposed to analyze the role, in bargaining and other distributive conflicts, of endogenously arising belief distortions linked to pride, dignity or wishful thinking about future outcomes. A first set of further applications may include contracts and organizational design. A second interesting direction is the political economy of reforms such as opening to trade or liberalizing the labor market. Whereas the standard concern is whether winners can credibly commit to compensating losers, a potentially equally important one is that the latter precisely do not want to see themselves (and be identified by others) as losers, now dependent on "handouts" from the rest of the community.
